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Comment
Plea Bargaining and Trial Penalties: When May the
State Legitimately Require Criminal Defendants to
Surrender Their Trial Rights
CHARLES H. CLARKE*
In the recent plea bargaining case of Corbitt v. New Jersey,I the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld harsher punishment for
defendants convicted at trial than for defendants who plead guilty.
The Court also authorized the use of punishment to induce guilty
pleas in a way that would make pleading guilty more attractive than
standing trial to all but the worst offenders and compulsive gamblers. The Court relied on inappropriate precedent to create a Hobson's choice for criminal defendants: plead guilty or forego any
chance of receiving mercy. This article will examine how the Court
improperly analogized penalty-induced guilty pleas to Cramptonv.
Ohio,2 wherein a state was permitted to require a defendant to give
up either the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to give
testimony relevant to mercy; it will also discuss the Court's illconsidered extension of Bordenkircher v. Hayes,3 which, because it
required the prosecution to bargain, failed to present the same dangers as a Corbitt plea bargaining system. Corbitt thus seriously
undermines the right to a trial; it may also portend the end of the
adversary system of criminal justice as it has been known.
In Corbitt the state failed to show any need to reduce the incidence of presumably futile criminal trials where a guilty verdict is
a foregone conclusion. Absent this showing of need, the Supreme
Court should not have authorized the use of severe trial penalties
to erode the adversary system of criminal justice; less extreme measures might adequately control presumed useless trials. Moreover,
even if a severe trial penalty system for administering criminal jus* B.A. 1953, Bethany College; J.D. 1954, University of Chicago. Professor, Detroit College
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tice is permissible, there ought to be minimum safeguards to protect
the defendant. Corbitt failed to require these safeguards, and thus
improperly disposed of a defendant's fundamental right to trial.
In murder cases, such as Corbitt,' New Jersey does not allow
bench trials, nor does it technically permit guilty pleas. 5 An accused
charged with murder, however, may plead non vult or nolo contendere.1 These pleas are substantially the same as a guilty plea in
jurisdictions which allow guilty pleas in murder cases, because each
effectuates a surrender of the defendant's right to trial.7
The acceptance of a plea of non vult or nolo contendere to a
murder indictment in New Jersey requires the trial court to determine that there is a factual basis for conviction.8 Acceptance of the
plea is discretionary, and the plea cannot be accepted if the defendant maintains his innocence, stands mute or refuses to admit the
facts that establish guilt Upon acceptance of the plea in a murder
case, the court need not determine whether first or second degree
murder is established"0 and may imprison the defendant for life or
impose the punishment for second degree murder, which is imprisonment for not more than thirty years. 1
A New Jersey first degree murder defendant, however, who prefers being tried to pleading guilty loses any chance of receiving
mercy if he is convicted. A trial conviction requires a mandatory life
sentence.12 Plea bargaining under the auspices of the court is allowed in New Jersey." Further, a defendant may withdraw a guilty
plea made pursuant to a plea bargain which the court rejects." On
the other hand, the prosecutor is not required to bargain with a
defendant even though the defendant may deserve mercy. The majority opinion in Corbitt said that as far as the record disclosed, the
defendant might have made a plea offer which was refused.15 It is
also possible that something completely different happened. IniI The indictment in Corbitt charged defendant with two counts of arson and one count of
murder committed in the course of an arson. The victim, a visitor at the dwelling, died of
smoke inhalation. The defendant pled not guilty and was subsequently convicted by a jury
for first degree murder. He was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Id.
Id. at 215.

'Id.
7Id.

Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 215 n.3.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 215.
12 Id.
'3

Id. at 222 n.11, 225 n.15.

Id. at 222 n.11.
'5

Id. at 223.
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tially, the prosecutor might have completely refused to plea bargain; then he might have told the defendant either to plead guilty
and hope for mercy from the court or to take his chances at trial of
escaping a mandatory life sentence. Whatever might have happened, New Jersey law allows the prosecutor to confront the defendant with just such a choice: either make a blind guilty plea" with
only a mere possibility for leniency, or receive a mandatory life
sentence for a trial conviction. The United States Supreme Court
approved the choice in a six to three decision with one of the majority judges concurring in the result, but not the reasoning.
THE

Corbitt PLEA BARGAINING SYSTEM AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

Corbitttakes the bargaining out of plea bargaining. The prosecutor does not have to bargain but rather can insist upon the defendant's unconditional surrender. Thus, Corbitt'splea bargaining system is not likely to elicit guilty pleas from defendants with no
chance of receiving mercy. If some of these defendants decide nonetheless to plead guilty, it will not be because mercy induced their
guilty pleas. On the other hand, the plea bargaining system is likely
to induce guilty pleas from those who deserve mercy and might be
acquitted if they went to trial. Corbitt advises this kind of defendant, however, to insist upon trial if he is dissatisfied with the
state's offer.
The trouble with this advice is that a state can always structure
7
its penalties to make pleading guilty preferable to standing trial
for a defendant who deserves mercy. Once a randomly selected punishment increase becomes acceptable as a device for inducing guilty
pleas, there is no way to stop its maximum effective use in inducing
defendants to forego the right to stand trial. Maximum punishment,
especially for intermediate felonies, can be reserved exclusively for
those who are tried and convicted. In these circumstances, defendants who deserve mercy will plead guilty in order to receive comparatively lenient punishment. Trial will become the prerogative of
those who have nothing to lose. They will primarily be the worst
offenders among those who commit a particular felony. Trial may

11State v.

Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379, 416, 378 A.2d 235, 254 (1977) (Pashman, J., dissenting),

affl'd, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
1 Cf. Ramsey v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979) (where the writ of certioari was dismissed
because it was improvidently granted). In Ramsey the defendant claimed that his sentence
was induced by a judge's threat to more than double the sentence proposed in a plea offer
and to approximately quadruple a sentence considered earlier.
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also attract a few adventurous souls willing to take Corbitt's all or
nothing gamble.
The Corbitt majority relied primarily upon two cases, Crampton
v. Ohio" and Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 9 The majority also distin0 which invalidated the death
guished United States v. Jackson,"
penalty in the federal kidnapping law because use of the penalty
was reserved exclusively for defendants convicted by a jury.
Bordenkircher upheld a mandatory life term for an habitual offender who improvidently refused the prosecutor's offer of a five
year prison sentence for his last offense, uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30. Jackson and Bordenkircherwill receive a more thorough discussion below following consideration of
the Court's reference to Crampton v. Ohio, which involved the use
of mercy in capital murder cases.

Crampton v. Ohio:

PERMISSIBLE BURDENS ON THE
EXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

The majority in Corbitt cited Crampton for the indisputable
proposition that "not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such
a right, is invalid."" They also discussed this proposition and
Crampton in a footnote" which examined the validity of occasionally confronting the criminal defendant with hard choices, such as
requiring him to give up either the right against self-incrimination
or the right to testify for mercy. The Corbitt majority, however,
overextended Crampton if they meant to suggest that it would permit the choice presented to a criminal defendant in Corbitt, between a trial but no mercy, or a possibility of mercy but no trial.
Crampton neither allows nor prohibits this choice. Although a
plea of innocence is usually incompatible with a plea for mercy, this
may not always be true. It would seem that self-defense, insanity
and mercy might occasionally travel hand-in-hand. There might be
other situations where the incompatibility between innocence and
mercy might not be so great and the defendant would prefer to try
for both in the same proceeding rather than to give up one or the
18402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated in part,408 U.S. 941 (1972) (death penalty vacated following
the rejection of standardless imposition of the death penalty by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972)).
It 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
20 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
21 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978).
22 Id. at 218 n.8.
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other. Cramptonleaves the defendant an opportunity for both. Consequently, it does not support the Corbitt result which forces the
defendant to choose one or the other.
The Crampton case, in itself, does not preclude the result in
Corbitt, however. In Crampton,guilt or innocence, and punishment
were determined by a jury in a single proceeding. Conviction meant
death unless the jury recommended mercy.2 Ohio law was unclear
whether evidence relating only to punishment was admissible in
capital murder cases. 24 No evidence offered by the defendant in
Crampton, however, was excluded on the ground that it was relevant only to punishment.2 Ohio allowed the defendant to "put before the jury a great deal of background evidence with at best a
tenuous connection to the issue of guilt. ' 2 In the Crampton case the
jury considered only evidence that was relevant to both guilt or
innocence, and punishment.
The defendant challenged the validity of using a single rather
than a bifurcated proceeding to decide both issues, claiming that
resolving both guilt or innocence and punishment in a single proceeding compelled him either to surrender the privilege against selfincrimiation or the right to give testimony relevant to mercy.2 After
assuming arguendo that the latter right was constitutionally protected, a majority of six judges ruled against him.
The Court decided that it was immaterial to the defendant's
claim whether he testified or chose not to testify because he would
be cross-examined about guilt or innocence if he testified about
punishment. Essentially, the defendant's claim was that he must be
allowed to testify and to limit the effect of his testimony to the issue
of punishment. The Court held that neither the privilege against
self-incrimination nor the right to testify for mercy permits a defendant who chooses to take the stand to limit the relevant uses of his
2
testimony or the issues about which he will testify.
Because Crampton assumed that the defendant had a constitutional right to testify and present evidence about mercy in a captial
case29 it is not particularly helpful in deciding whether the state can
13 Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 195 (1971), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 941 (1972) (death
penalty vacated following the rejection of standardless imposition of the death penalty by
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).

Id. at 219.

24

Id.
Id.

23
26

2 Id. at 211.
2 Id. at 214, 220.
21 Id. at 218-19.
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deny mercy to defendants who choose to be tried where the right to
mercy is not constitutionally protected.
Further, Crampton would not support a law requiring the defendant to choose between mercy and a trial in a capital case, for the
right to mercy in a capital case is now a fundamental right. 0
Crampton v. Ohio, however, actually held that due process permitted the jury to make a standardless imposition of the death penalty.3 1 The jury was allowed to dispense mercy, but was given no real
guidance" about its uses.32 Furman v. Georgia33 subsequently construed the cruel and unusual punishment clause to forbid standardless imposition of the death penalty. Later death penalty cases, such
as Gregg v. Georgia,3" produced plurality opinions upholding the
death penalty by requiring consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposition of a death sentence.3 5 Since
a criminal defendant now has a constitutional right to plead for
mercy in a capital case as well as a right to trial, the state cannot
make him choose one or the other.
Of course, a majority in Corbitt v. New Jersey8 did find
Crampton an example of a defendant validly compelled to choose
between two rights. Nevertheless, the Corbitt majority could only
have meant to rely upon Crampton if it had some bearing upon
requiring a defendant to choose between a trial and mercy in a
noncapital case, such as Corbitt, which involved a mandatory life
sentence.
There is considerable difficulty with this use of Crampton, however. Crampton allowed a state to require a defendant to choose
between self-incrimination and mercy in a capital case. The permissibility of this choice rests upon the validity of using a single proceeding to determine both guilt or innocence, and mercy in a capital
case, a proceeding Crampton allowed. The plurality opinion in
30 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193, 196-98, 206 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
270-71 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 333-34 (1976) (mandatory death penalty for all persons convicted of five categories of first
degree murder was invalid because it did not allow appropriate consideration of mitigating
circumstances); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (mandatory death
penalty for all persons convicted of first degree murder is invalid).
3, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 941 (1972) (death penalty vacated
following the rejection of standardless imposition of the death penalty by Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
" Id. at 194-95.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
' 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
See cases cited note 30 supra.
31439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978).
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Gregg v. Georgia37 questioned, if it did not repudiate, the use of a
single proceeding for determining both issues in a captial case.
Speaking about the desirability of jury sentencing in capital
cases, the plurality opinion of Justice Stewart said:
Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even
be extremely prejudicial to a fair determination of that question. This problem, however, is scarcely unsurmountable. Those
who have studied the problem suggest that a bifurcated procedure-one in which the question of sentence is not considered
until the determination of guilt has been made-is the best
answer."
After a brief explanation, this advice was repeated, 9 although in
referring to the bifurcated procedure and related matters, the plurality opinion also said: "We do not intend to suggest that only the
above-described procedures would be permissible ...
"10
Nevertheless, the plurality opinion seemed to weaken this disclaimer somewhat in footnote 4741 on the same page of the opinion.
The footnote mentions the single proceeding as well as the standardless sentencing in Crampton v. Ohio. 2 It then says that as a result
of Furman v. Georgia,3 McGautha is "a precedent only for the
proposition that standardless jury sentencing procedures were not
employed in the cases before the Court so as to violate the Due
Process Clause. ' " Evidence relevant t6 punishment in Crampton,
of course, was not used unless it was also relevant to guilt or innocence."5 Consequently, Cramptondid not rule upon a single proceeding involving the use of evidence relevant to punishment, but irrelevant and prejudicial to a fair guilt or innocence determination.
Thus, the three judges who joined in Gregg's plurality opinion by
Mr. Justice Stewart questioned the fairness of Crampton's single
proceeding. Two other judges still on the Court, Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissented in Crampton on the ground that its single
37428 U.S. 153 (1976).
' Id.
at 190-91 (footnotes omitted).
3 Id. at 191-92.
+ Id. at 195.
1Id. at 195-96.
42402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacatedinpart, 408 U.S. 941 (1972) (death penalty vacated following
the rejection of standardless imposition of the death penalty by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972)).
43 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
" 428 U.S. 153, 195-96 n.47 (1976).
402 U.S. 183, 214, 219, 220 (1971), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); see also id. at
234 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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proceeding prevented a fair determination of guilt or innocence."
On the other hand, four judges now on the Court would have reaffirmed Crampton's single proceeding for determining guilt or innocence and punishment in Roberts v. Louisiana.47 In a dissent to
Roberts, Justice White, joined by Burger, Blackmun and Rehnquist, claimed that the plurality opinion in Roberts invalidated Louisiana's capital sentencing statute in murder cases "for want of a
separate proceeding in which the sentencing authority may focus on
the sentence and consider some or all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances."" It is not clear, however, that the plurality
opinion in Roberts goes this far.
It has also been said that the plurality opinion in Gregg and
companion cases displaced or made Crampton inoperative, even if
they did not reject the case." The reasons given for the displacement
are similar to those given in Gregg for questioning Crampton.Essentially, these reasons are that the later death penalty cases require a
far more wide ranging hearing upon the death sentence than
Crampton required. This hearing involves the consideration of evidence that would be excluded as irrelevant or prejudicial in determining guilt or innocence.1°
It is immaterial whether Gregg and its plurality opinion technically overruled Cramptonrespecting the constitutionality of a single
proceeding for determining guilt or innocence, and punishment in
a capital case. A legislator cognizant of the Gregg Court's doubting
comments about Crampton's single proceeding would be reluctant
to recommend a one stage proceeding in a capital case unless he
thought that law were primarily an experiment or an adventure. In
any event, the majority in Corbitt v. New Jersey5 made a questionable ruling about plea bargaining by relying upon a precedent,
Crampton, which seemed discredited until its unexplained reappearance in Corbitt.
Bordenkircher and Jackson
The uses of mercy in plea bargaining were also presented in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,52 decided only a term of court before
1sId.

at 230-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

41428 U.S. 325, 356 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
,RId. at 356.
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAnv. L. REv. 58, 73 n.71 (1976).
50

Id.

51439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978).
52434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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Corbitt v. New Jersey." The majority in Corbitt said that Corbitt
and Bordenkircherwere substantially the same case. The opposite
decision, however, could have been reached in the Bordenkircher
case without considering the uses of mercy in inducing guilty pleas.
In Bordenkircheran habitual offender received a life sentence for
forging an instrument in the amount of $88.30 after turning down
the prosecutor's comparatively generous offer of a five-year term for
pleading guilty to forgery. Initially, the indictment was for forgery
only. The prosecutor threatened to get an habitual offender indictment if the plea offer was rejected; the prosecutor carried out his
threat. Thus, Bordenkirchercould have been decided for the defendant on the ground of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
The defendant in Bordenkircherargued that reindicting him as
an habitual offender after he rejected the prosecutor's plea offer
established vindictiveness. 4 The Court rejected this argument since
it thought that the prosecutor could have proceeded as he did if the
defendant had been initially charged as an habitual offender.5 Of
course, merely reindicting the defendant did not show vindictiveness. The prosecutor's intial evaluation of the offense, however, and
his escalation of the offense upon rejection of his plea offer might
well have sufficed to establish vindictiveness, as the dissenting Supreme Court Justices as well as the court of appeals maintained.56
A plea offer of five years to a defendant whose offense deserves
life imprisonment must be a rare occurrence. The forgery statute
violated by the defendant prescribed a maximum prison term of ten
years. " The prosecutor treated the case as one of aggravated forgery
until the defendant refused his plea offer. The defendant's rejection
of the offer did not change the seriousness of the offense.
The prosecutor admitted that he caused the defendant to be reindicted simply because the defendant wanted a trial.5 These circum0 in
stances reminded the dissenting judges59 of Blackledge v. Perry,"
which due process forbade the prosecutor from indicting the defendant for a higher offense because the defendant exercised his right
to an automatic trial de novo after having been convicted of the
lesser included offense with which he was- initially charged. This
53 439 U.S. 212 (1978).

5, 434 U.S. 357, 360 (1978).

Id.
I'
5, Hayes v. Cowen, 547 F.2d 42, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1976), rehearingdenied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
57 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978).
11Id. at 360.
5, Id. at 365-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
0417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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restriction upon the use of the power to indict was held necessary
to prevent prosecutorial vindictiveness against a defendant for exercising his trial rights. Thus, prosecutorial vindictiveness is escalation of an offense by the prosecutor beyond its seriousness, as determined by the state's settlement policy, merely because a defendant
exercises his trial rights. On the other hand, there is no prosecutorial
vindictiveness in a trial and conviction upon the highest offense
charged in the indictment after the defendant rejects the prosecutor's generous offer to compromise a weak case.
The dissenting judges in Bordenkircher thought that the defendant there deserved the same protection as in Blackledge v. Perry.61
They believed that escalation of the offense after the defendant
refused to plead guilty to a smaller offense should have been regarded as vindictiveness unless the prosecutor made some other
explanation. This explanation was not forthcoming. Consequently,
the dissenting judges in Bordenkircher thought that protection
against prosecutorial vindictiveness required the case to be settled
as a forgery case rather than an habitual offender case. This would
have permitted release of the defendant from prison after he served
the maximum sentence for forgery."
This resolution of the Bordenkircher case, however, would not
really have addressed the use of mercy to induce guilty pleas. It
would not have been responsive to the case where a maximum sentence is well-deserved unless mitigating circumstances make mercy
appropriate. Moreover, it is possible that Bordenkircher is not the
kind of case where mercy and plea bargaining are usually found
hand in hand. Bordenkircher may have been merely an isolated
lapse from the otherwise impeccable rectitude of a get-tough policy
for habitual offenders. In such a case, the state would really have
no mercy policy for these offenders; consequently, mercy would have
no part to play in plea bargaining with them.
Corbitt and Bordenkircherare similar, however, if the mandatory
life sentence in Bordenkircherwas only a mask to hide a general and
liberal dispensation of mercy in habitual offender cases. Of course,
there are also differences between the two cases. The plea bargaining system in Bordenkircher,for example, seemed to have a cutting
edge which was not present in the Corbitt system. In a Corbitt
situation, it is possible for a defendant to receive mercy even though
he pleads guilty to a first degree murder charge. On the other hand,
61 Id.
62

434 U.S. 357, 365-68, 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 368 71 (Powell, J.,

dissenting).
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a guilty plea to an habitual offender indictment in a Bordenkircher
situation presumably means a mandatory life sentence. Thus, the
Bordenkirchersystem leaves the matter of mercy completely in the
hands of the prosecutor: the defendant either takes what the prosecutor offers or goes to prison for life if he loses at trial.
The Bordenkircher system of plea bargaining, however, does require the prosecutor to plea bargain if he wants to avoid trial. The
defendant will receive a life sentence whether he pleads guilty to an
habitual offender indictment or is convicted at trial. Consequently,
failure of the prosecutor to plea bargain will normally result in a
trial because the defendant has nothing to gain by pleading guilty.
Moreover, a trial may result in an acquittal.
The Corbitt system of plea bargaining does not require the prosecutor to plea bargain in order to get the defendant to plead guilty.
Under a. Corbitt system, unlike a Bordenkirchersystem, the defendant can receive mercy by pleading guilty, and if the prosecutor
chooses not to plea bargain, pleading guilty is the only way a defendant can receive mercy. -Consequently, if the prosecutor will not
plea bargain, the defendant knows that he must either make a blind
plea63 of guilty and hope for something less than a life sentence or
go to trial and receive a mandatory life sentence if he is found guilty.
In such a situation, a defendant who has a better chance for mercy
than acquittal will be under enormous pressure to plead guilty.
Moreover the prosecutor does not have to make a plea offer to such
a defendant.
The Corbitt majority's extreme position proved to be too much for
Justice Stewart who had written the opinion of the Court in
Bordenkircher.Although he concurred with the Corbitt majority, he
could not accept what he understood its reasoning to be. He hypothesized that this reasoning would allow plea conviction for an offense
to be punished at one-half the penalty authorized for trial conviction for the offense. 4
Justices Stevens, Brennan and Marshall, who dissented in
Corbitt, found that New Jersey's plea bargaining system was invalid
under United States v. Jackson.6 5 In Jackson, the death penalty in
the federal kidnapping statute was struck down because it was prescribed only for defendants who were convicted by a jury that recommended a death sentence. Unlike Jackson's administration of
"

State v. Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379, 416, 378 A.2d 235, 254 (1977) (Pashman, J., dissenting),

affl'd, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
" 439 U.S. 212, 227 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

13 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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the death penalty, New Jersey did not reserve a life sentence in first
degree murder cases only for defendants who received a trial; in
Corbitt the judge had discretionary power to impose a life sentence
upon defendants who plead non vult. 6
The Corbitt majority said that this distinguished Corbitt from
Jackson. 7 The dissenting Justices disagreed, contending that a
higher standard of punishment for a trial conviction penalized the
right to plead not guilty. 8 The majority's basis for distinguishing
Jackson may turn out to be nothing more than a matter of trivial
degree, for it is likely that in New Jersey only a few defendants who
plead guilty to first degree murder will receive a life sentence.
Jackson and Corbitt are plainly inconsistent. Both cases involve
an uneven application of penalties to induce defendants to waive
their constitutional rights. Moreover, the pressure exerted upon a
susceptible defendant to induce the waiver tends to be irresistible
in both cases.
In Jackson, the jury had a discretionary power to impose the
death penalty." Further, only the jury could impose the penalty.
Consequently, a defendant faced a serious risk of receiving a death
sentence if he chose a jury trial, a risk which disappeared if he
waived a jury.
It would have been possible to correct this uneven application of
the death penalty by giving the judge the discretionary power to
impose the death sentence in bench trials. Then, a defendant would
be exposed to the same standard of punishment whether he was
tried by a judge or a jury. Even this corrected situation, however, is
not like Corbitt.In a Corbitt situation, a defendant who chooses any
trial, bench71 or jury, will receive a mandatory life sentence if convicted. On the other hand, he is subject only to a discretionary life
sentence if he pleads guilty. The standards of punishment for plea
and trial defendants are thus different, just as the standards of
punishment for bench and jury trial defendants were different in
Jackson.
In other words, the flaw in Jackson did not seem to lie in that no
bench trial defendant could receive the death penalty. The Court,
for example, gave no indication that it would have approved a man" 439 U.S. 212, 215 (1978).

*7Id. at 217.
Id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
, 390 U.S. 570, 570-71 (1968).
70 Id. at 572.
n New Jersey law, hiowever, forbade bench trials in murder cases. See note 3 & accompanying text supra.
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datory death penalty in jury trials and a discretionary death penalty
in bench trials. In fact, the Jackson Court intimated the opposite
by deciding that the governmental objective of ameliorating the
mandatory death penalty did not justify a discretionary death penalty for only jury trial defendants. 72 Forbidding this kind of amelioration would also invalidate amelioration which made the death
penalty discretionary in bench trials and mandatory in jury trials.
Finally, inducing bench trials or guilty pleas could not possibly
justify what would be forbidden in the interest of ameliorating the
death penalty.
Consequently the flaw in Jackson was not the mere absence of the
death penalty in bench trials for kidnapping. Similarly, Corbitt is
not without flaw merely because some first degree murder defendants who plead guilty will receive the maximum authorized punishment. Instead, the facts presented in Corbitt and Jackson have
the same flaw: a more severe standard of punishment for defendants
who do not waive their constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the pressure exerted upon a susceptible defendant
to waive his constitutional rights tends to be irresistible in both
Jackson and Corbitt situations. Most persons would willingly forego
a good chance for acquittal by a jury in order to avoid certain death
if that good chance proved to be disappointing. Similarly, few would
throw away a good chance for mercy if the consequence of a mistaken choice meant life- imprisonment. The question is not whether
a death sentence is more coercive than life imprisonment, but instead whether life imprisonment is coercive enough in some situations. Consequently, it does not seem that the uniqueness of the
death penalty distinguishes Jackson from Corbitt even though the
Corbitt majority suggested otherwise."
In any event, it is interesting that the Corbitt majority said "we
need not agree with the New Jersey court that the Jackson rationale
is limited to those cases where a plea avoids any possibility of the
death penalty being imposed."" The Court, of course, did not foreclose the possibility of agreement, and it may be called upon soon
to decide whether it does agree. In amending its death penalty law,
for example, Ohio authorized a more lenient administration of its
death penalty for plea defendants than for trial defendants. The
validity of this disparate treatment was not decided in a recent case,
Lockett v. Ohio,7 5 which struck down the Ohio death penalty for its
-,390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968).
- 489 U.S. 212, 217 (1978).
11Id. at 217.
73 438 U.S. 586, 618-19 (1978) (Blackman, J., concurring).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:71

unduly narrow prescription of mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun, who voted with the majority in
Bordenkircher and Corbitt, felt compelled in Lockett to say that he
thought Jackson precluded Ohio's more lenient administration of
thedeath penalty for defendants who plead guilty."
PENALTY-INDUCED PLEA BARGAINING
The Efficacy of a Trial Penalty System
7
The unasked, but answered question in Corbitt v. New Jersey
was whether the state should be given authority to almost completely replace the trial adversary system of criminal justice with a
system of penalty-induced guilty pleas. The Supreme Court at least
should have required a showing of actual need to scrap the present
trial adversary system before authorizing its destruction. As it was,
the Court did not even consider whether some hypothetical need
78
might justify this change.
Hypothetical need might not allow a uniform answer to the question of what should be done when trials impair the administration
of criminal justice. There must surely be some units of local government in the country which can control their criminal dockets without the use of trial penalties. On the other hand, the risk to criminal
law enforcement presented by universal trials should not be minimized. A defendant who has nothing to lose by demanding a trial
may also have no good reason for not making the demand. It certainly seems that trials for all criminal defendants would seriously
impair criminal justice administration in some jurisdictions. The
enforcement of large segments of the criminal law might have to be
forgotten.
The possibility of serious harm arising from universal trial demands by criminal defendants cannot be denied. This possibility is
irrelevant, nevertheless, to whether trials should be largely abolished by severe trial penalties in the interest of more effective law
76 Id. The plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-85 (1976), suggests that
the death penalty is appropriate only for persons whose crime is so monstrous that they are
not fit to live. This conception of the death penalty ought to make its use as a device to extract
guilty pleas in first degree murder cases questionable even though sparing the defendant's
life may be the only inducement which would make him plead guilty.
77439 U.S. 212 (1978).
's As a plea bargaining case, Corbitt was an accident rather than a deliberate, considered
response to the problems of plea bargaining. Mandatory life imprisonment for first degree
murder in New Jersey came about when the New Jersey Supreme Court prescribed it after
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), invalidated New Jersey's death penalty.
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enforcement for any particular system of criminal justice. The question here is not what would happen if all defendants suddenly demanded a trial, but whether a severe trial penalty system would
result in increased criminal law enforcement. In other words, the
inquiry is whether there would be prison sentences or fines for offenses which must now be overlooked with the resources presently
available. Consequently, authority to abolish an existing trial adversary system should not be given upon mere request. The administrators of a particular criminal justice system should have to show
how many trials could be avoided by a trial penalty system and how
many and what kind of plea convictions would result from the time
saved by avoiding trials.
Even a severe penalty system would not, of course, eliminate all
trials. No trial penalty is likely to induce a guilty plea to the most
serious offenses. The punishment for the most serious offenses will
be at or near the maximum regardless of whether there is a plea or
trial conviction. The pressure exerted by an additional trial penalty
would be inconsequential.
It seems unlikely, for example, that a severe trial penalty could
affect the disposition of most first degree murder cases when the
death penalty is not imposed. Plea bargaining, of course, might
remain possible on the basis of the strength or weakness of the
state's case or whether the defendant can help to convict others. The
threat of five additional life sentences for insisting upon a trial,
however, is not likely to induce a guilty plea even if the additional
sentences are consecutive. Moreover, absent capital punishment,
first degree murder cases would not seem to offer much promise for
the operation of a leniency policy if a trial penalty were to consist
merely of a denial of leniency. Extending considerable leniency to
those who kill deliberately and with premeditation probably would
not be cheerfully accepted in any community. Moreover, in other
serious felony cases, a trial penalty is not likely to induce a guilty
plea from offenders who know that their circumstances require the
maximum sentence for their class of offense. The same is true of a
defendant whose age will require him to spend all or most of the rest
of his life in prison even if he receives a moderate sentence. In short,
there must be some cases which the state cannot simply afford to
compromise in any way. These cases may be numerous and they do
result in trial convictions. They must also be excluded from any
computation of the time which might be saved by using severe trial
penalties to reduce the number of trials.
One must legitimately wonder how much more criminal law enforcement would occur if the trial system were abolished as fully as
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possible by severely penalizing losing trial defendants. Presumably
defendants who plead guilty would not be penalized for requesting
a preliminary examination when it is available. Further, after the
pretrial stages of a case are completed, the extra time spent in trying
a case might not bring substantial additional criminal law enforcement. A large part of the increase might reach crimes less serious
than those currently disposed of by suspended sentences or probation. Increasing the caseload in these categories would seem to be a
poor reason for abolishing the trial system of criminal justice.
Moreover, it ought to be possible to estimate the benefits of
largely abolishing the trial system for administering criminal justice. The administrators of any particular criminal justice system,
for example, ought to be able to identify the trials that would be
eliminated by the use of trial penalties. These administrators also
ought to be able to estimate how many more convictions would
occur if the time saved by eliminating these trials were used to get
plea convictions. Naturally, this would not necessarily show what
the loss of law enforcement might be in a system free of trial penalties, for a particular system may contain trial penalties hidden by
a discretionary sentencing power.
The projected increase in law enforcement in the form of additional prison sentences or fines for presently neglected offenses
could then be seen and evaluated. It is possible that this same
increase could be obtained by more direct spending on enforcement.
Further, consideration could be given to the possibility of foregoing
the projected increase in fines and prison sentences, but calculating
this increase and adding it to the punishment of defendants who are
convicted at trial. A punishment increase of this kind would be
proportionate to the harm done to a criminal justice system by a
trial presumed needless. Further, this kind of punishment increase
might accomplish the desired reduction in presumably needless
trials. It might stop needless trials, for example, as efficiently as the
recently recognized power of the trial judge to increase a defendant's
prison sentence in proportion to the flagrancy of his perjury when
he gives testimony which the trial judge finds perjurious. 7 In fact,
this latter power and the power to increase punishment in proportion to the estimated harm caused by a presumably needless trial
might eliminate any need for severe trial penalties. Moreover, constitutionally requiring a projection of the benefits of abolishing the
trial system before allowing it to be abolished would also set the
goals of the new system. A failure to realize these goals might sug-

", United

States v. Grayson, 434 U.S. 816 (1978).
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gest use of the policymaking processes of government to reinstate
the trial system. In any event, whatever case may be made for
abolishing the trial system of criminal justice has yet to be proven.
It is possible, of course, that a case can be made for abolishing
the trial system of administering criminal justice by imposing the
most extreme penalties upon defendants who are convicted at trial.
Even if this were true, however, the extreme trial penalty systems
0 and Bordenkircher
authorized by Corbitt v. New Jersey"
v. Hayes8'
have flaws which ought to make them unconstitutional. In both
cases, only a small class of defendants were selected for extreme
penalties. Further, Corbitt did not require the prosecutor to plea
bargain.
Other Justificationsfor a Trial Penalty System
The only justification for extreme trial penalties is that the harm
resulting to a criminal justice system from needless trials is serious
and incalculable. In other words, the magnitude of the harm is so
great that the state must maximize the inducement to plead guilty.
This objective cannot be accomplished, however, by using extreme
pressure to extract guilty pleas only from defendants in first degree
murder or habitual offender cases. Giving extreme plea treatment
to only one class of defendants in a criminal justice system is inconsistent with the premise that presumably needless trials threaten
the system, for the harm done to a state's criminal justice system
by a needless three day murder trial is the same as the harm done
by a needless three day trial for unlawful gambling.
Moreover, a plea bargaining system involving a deliberately articulated sentence increase for not pleading guilty seems unjustifiable
when the prosecutor has no duty to plea bargain. If the defendant's
fundamental trial rights are to be induced away, the state should
provide a better substitute than the unconditional surrender of the
defendant.2 It seems unfair to blame a defendant for the consequences of a presumably useless trial when the state refuses to offer
an alternative, such as a definite plea bargain, which could avoid
these consequences. The state can hardly blame the defendant for
refusing to plead guilty when the state itself is not interested in plea
bargaining.
- 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
s, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
But see State v. Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379, 385, 378 A.2d 235, 238 (1977) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting), affl'd, 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
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A Corbitt system of plea bargaining should require the prosecutor
to bargain or explain his refusal to bargain. Further, the plea bargain should offer the defendant a definite sentence and permit him
to withdraw his guilty plea if the court fails to approve the plea
bargain. Moreover, the prosecutor's plea offer or refusal to bargain
should be subject to judicial oversight by the trial judge, and a trial
penalty disallowed when the prosecutor's position is found unwarranted." These procedures should minimize prosecutorial vindictiveness in plea bargaining. Of course, in Weatherford v. Bursey,84
the Supreme Court said that criminal defendants do not have a
constitutional right to engage in plea bargaining. The defendant
there, however, complained that the state's refusal to tell him that
his apparent accomplice was a state undercover agent diminished
his opportunity to plea bargain. The case did not decide what the
state's obligation to plea bargain would be if it chose to eliminate
trials as much as possible by inducing guilty pleas.
Systematic statutory or administrative plea bargaining is commonplace in the nation's traffic courts and other courts for minor
offenses. Many states, for example, have a two-tier system of criminal justice for minor offenses which permits an automatic trial de
novo after conviction in the lower tier and increased penalties for
conviction in the higher tier. 5 In most of these systems, the expense
to the state of conducting the second trial would probably be an
obvious justification for the usual punishment disparity between
the two courts. When this is not true, it may be possible to explain
8
the difference in punishments on other grounds. 1
The kind of sentence increases authorized by Corbitt and
Bordenkircher should be consitutional only if the state can justify
them and is willing to engage in good faith plea bargaining with the
defendant. Rejection of Corbitt and Bordenkircher to this extent
might also require good faith plea bargaining procedures in plea
systems which do not have admitted trial penalties for defendants
convicted at trial. It might be impossible to know whether these plea
systems have trial penalties if their existence were not officially
recognized, for a discretionary sentencing power with a wide range
of punishments for similarly situated offenders can make such trial
83 In states where the jury has a sentencing function, the trial judge could make an appropriate increase or decrease in the jury's sentence.
84 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
u Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112 n.4 (1972); cf. Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S.
618 (1976) (procedural variation).
11The actual harm done to a particular criminal justice system by a presumed useless trial,
for example, would justify an appropriate penalty increase.
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penalties invisible. Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that plea
bargaining should not be conducted in the shadows."7 Invisible trial
penalties will remain possible, however, in plea systems where trial
penalties are not admitted, unless safeguards against the abuses of
visible trial penalties are required for these systems.
CONCLUSION
There may be an urgent need to reduce trial caseloads among the
nation's criminal justice systems. In view of the Supreme Court's
natural reluctance, however, to reconsider recent matters which it
has solemnly decided, the extent of this need may never become
known. The Court has authorized the use of trial penalties to erode
the trial system of criminal justice without any showing of need,
without requiring a rational use of trial penalties and without any
protection of the interests of the defendant. Thus, the fundamental
right to a trial in a criminal case has been dispatched without even
so much as the ceremony or explanation which usually attends the
obliteration of nonfundamental interests, which may permissibly be
destroyed when there is a rational basis for doing so.88
The state has been given the maximum power to resolve the problems and aggravations of plea bargaining. The Supreme Court has
gratuitously handed the state a broadsword when a scalpel might
do the job. Perhaps the state may find it unnecessary to use the
broadsword even if the Supreme Court does not take it back.
17 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
" Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 468-71 (1977) (because state welfare benefits are not a
fundamental right, a state does not have to fund nontherapeutic abortions for indigent mothers when it pays childbirth expenses forindigent mothers); Massachusettes Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315-17 (1976) (physically fit policemen can be forced to retire at age

50).

